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Mired in Reservations: The Path-Dependent History
of Electoral Quotas in India
FRANCESCA R. JENSENIUS
Since independence, India has had electoral quotas for Scheduled Castes (SCs, Dalits,
“untouchables”). These quotas have been praised for empowering members of a deprived
community, but have also been criticized for bringing to power SC politicians who are
mere tools in the hands of the upper castes. Tracing the history of these quotas through
four critical junctures, I show how a British attempt to strengthen their own control of
India eventually resulted in one of the world’s most extensive quota systems for minorities.
The quota system was in the end a compromise between several political goals, and was
not strongly supported by anyone. Also, while the quotas were designed to integrate SC
politicians into mainstream politics, there was a subtle and gradual shift in the debate
about them, to being about development for the SC community as such. This created a
disjuncture between the design of the quota system and the expectation of what it
would achieve. The case of quotas in India illustrates how policy choices often result
from long path-dependent processes, how policy makers struggle with trade-offs when
trying to design institutions, and also the power of expectations in shaping the perceptions
of the outcomes of those institutions.
INTRODUCTION
THE SCHEDULED CASTES (SCS, Dalits, the former “untouchables”) in India were tradi-tionally marginalized, uneducated, and poor.1 Although they are still considered
one of India’s most vulnerable minorities, they are also among the best represented
groups in the country’s political system today. Since 1950, India has had electoral
quotas (or “reservations”) for SCs in the national Parliament and in state assemblies, pro-
portional to their share of the population (about 16 percent). This quota system has been
praised for empowering members of a deprived community, but also has been criticized
for bringing to power SC politicians who are mere tools in the hands of the upper castes.
The electoral constituencies reserved for SCs are single-member districts where SCs are
generally a minority among the electorate, and voters from all caste groups are eligible to
Francesca R. Jensenius (fj@nupi.no) is Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs.
1The term “Scheduled Castes” was introduced in the Government of India Act of 1935, defined as
“such castes, races or tribes or parts of groups within castes, races or tribes, which appear to His
Majesty in Council to correspond to the classes of persons formerly known as the ‘Depressed
Classes’, as His Majesty in Council may prefer” (Government of India 1942). The Government
of India (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1936 and the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order of
1950 contained lists (or schedules) of castes eligible for certain benefits, such as running for election
in constituencies reserved for SCs.
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vote (joint electorates). In consequence, elected SC politicians are usually answerable to a
majority of non-SC voters.
This particular design of the Indian quota system—reserved constituencies with joint
electorates—was the result of several decades of political struggle. In this article I
examine four critical junctures in this struggle, to show the importance of the sequence
of events in shaping the design and perceptions of today’s quota system. At each point in
time, the negotiating partners and their power relations were different, but the agenda
was shaped by choices made in the past. By tracing the process of negotiations over
time, I show how the colonial practice of selecting communal representatives in order
to strengthen Britain’s own control of India created a tradition of group-based represen-
tation, finally resulting in the entrenchment of reservations as the most important polit-
ical safeguard in independent India.
The case of quotas for SCs in India illustrates how policy choices often result from
long path-dependent processes rather than clear-cut strategic choices at one point in
time. It is also an example of how policy makers struggle with trade-offs when trying
to design institutions. In many cases there is no “correct” or “best” institutional choice,
but rather a number of possible solutions—each with its own advantages and disadvan-
tages. The drafters of the Indian Constitution were keenly aware that different designs
of the quota system would create different incentives for the politicians elected from re-
served seats. They recognized that the strong bias against the SC community, as well as
their educational and economic deprivation, would make it difficult for SC candidates to
be politically competitive in open elections. But they were also worried about exacerbat-
ing existing social cleavages. Rather than creating a quota system of SC politicians repre-
senting SC interests, they therefore sought to integrate SC politicians into mainstream
politics by making them appeal to voters from various caste groups. The quotas were
therefore deliberately designed to have an integrating effect and reduce caste barriers,
instead of creating champions of SC interests.
While the intentions of the drafters of the Indian Constitution were quite clear—to
integrate SC politicians into mainstream politics—the process tracing in this article also
shows a subtle and gradual shift in the debate about quotas for SCs to being about devel-
opment for the SC community as such. This is probably why the quotas for SCs are some-
times denounced as a failure—because they do not seem to have led to tangible
developmental benefits for the SC community—although they have in fact been very suc-
cessful at guaranteeing the political presence of an otherwise marginalized group. This
case therefore shows both the importance of institutional design in shaping outcomes
and the power of expectations in shaping perceptions of those outcomes.
CONTEXT
Reservations have been a major political issue in India in recent decades. There are
several types of reservations, including reserved seats in legislative assemblies, village
councils, governmental jobs, and educational institutions. The reserved seats in legislative
assemblies—in focus here—have received the least attention by far, although they con-
stitute one of the most extensive electoral quota systems in the world. This system has
been in place since 1950, when the Constituent Assembly granted SCs and Scheduled
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Tribes (STs) reserved seats in the lower house of Parliament and the state assemblies in
proportion to their share of the population in each state (on average approximately 16
percent and 8 percent, respectively). The exact locations of these reserved constituencies
have changed a few times since independence; Figure 1 shows which parliamentary con-
stituencies have been reserved since 2008.2
In constituencies reserved for SCs, only individuals belonging to an SC community
may run for election, although the whole electorate votes, irrespective of caste. Since the
SC community is spread across India, its members are usually a minority in the constit-
uencies reserved for them, so most SC politicians are elected by a majority of non-SC
voters.3 In contrast, in constituencies reserved for STs, only STs can run for election—
but there is often a majority ST population in areas reserved for STs. The history of
Figure 1. Parliamentary constituencies reserved for SCs since 2008. Figure created
by author using geocoded maps from GISMAP IN and information about the reserva-
tion status of constituencies given by the Delimitation Commission of India (2008).
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these groups and the discussions of their quota systems are quite distinct, and in this
article I only focus on the history of the SC quotas.
The quotas for SCs give political power to SC individuals, and could therefore be
expected to be popular among the SC community. However, many SC politicians and ac-
tivists have criticized them for bringing to power the wrong type of SC representatives.
The prominent SC politician Kanshi Ram (1982) argued that SC representatives who win
elections in India are chamchas (stooges or sycophants) who do not properly represent
SC interests, because they have to cater to the interests of a non-SC electorate in
order to win elections. In a series of interviews with politicians, senior civil servants,
and political activists in several Indian states in 2010 and 2011, I found that this was
not an uncommon perception of the SC quota system.4 One SC activist in Lucknow
said he considered the political reservation system to be “useless,” because SC politicians
do not work for the interests of SCs.5 Similarly, in Himachal Pradesh an SC activist told
me: “It makes no difference. The representatives follow the party line and are only con-
cerned about themselves and their families. All that reservations have done is pacify the
caste people [SCs] and get the upper-caste people angry that they can’t run for election.”6
The SC politicians I spoke with were slightly more positive. They noted that political
quotas have been important in creating leadership and giving SCs access to elite
positions. Several respondents stated that they would not have been able to win elections
the first time around without the help of the reservation system. Thus, they agreed that
reservations have led to greater political access for SCs. However, they did not think that
SC representatives work more for SCs than do other politicians. This was attributed to
the fact that SC politicians were answerable to a non-SC electorate and were also con-
trolled by their political parties. As one SC politician in the northern state of Uttar
Pradesh explained, “I have to work for all, for the majority of the voters; how would
2For more on the delimitation of constituencies and the selection of reserved seats, see Jensenius
(2013).
3From 1951 to 1961, the reservation system was organized differently: all constituencies had one
general seat, and in addition some of them had a seat reserved for an SC or ST politician. This
created both confusion and dissatisfaction; the practice was ended in 1961with the Two-Member
Constituencies (Abolition) Act, which stipulated that India should have only single-member constit-
uencies. The Lok Sabha debates about this Act indicate that it was difficult to conduct electoral
campaigns in the multi-member constituencies because they were large and unwieldy, and some
felt that SC politicians became tag-along politicians to influential general-category candidates.
Since then, the reserved seats have been in single-member constituencies.
4I conducted more than one hundred interviews with cabinet ministers, Members of Legislative
Assemblies, pradhans (heads of village councils), Indian Administrative Service officers (senior
civil servants), activists, other elites, and voters. Most of the interviews were conducted in Delhi,
Himachal Pradesh (Shimla and Solan), Uttar Pradesh (Lucknow, Meerut, and Varanasi), and Ban-
galore. The interviews were semi-structured, lasting between fifteen minutes and three hours each.
In Shimla, Solan, Varanasi, and Delhi, I conducted the interviews alone, while in the rest of the
locations I worked with a collaborator or a research assistant. Most of the interviews in North
India were conducted in Hindi, while those in South India were conducted in English. The inter-
views were not recorded, so the quotes provided in the text are translations fromHindi based on my
field notes.
5Interview in Lucknow, November 21, 2010.
6Interview in Shimla, October 11, 2010.
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I otherwise win the election?”7 A senior SC politician in Himachal Pradesh even told me
that SC politicians tend to do less for SCs than other politicians because they fear losing
non-SC votes if they seem “too SC.”8
Many of those I interviewed had ideas for alternative designs of the quota system that
they thought would work better—such as separate electorates, party candidate quotas,
economic rather than caste-based quotas, or no quotas at all. Such discussions are
nothing new. The particular type of electoral quotas that India adopted was the result
of several decades of iterative negotiations. The major decisions on reservations were
taken at the time of the drafting of the Government of India Acts of 1909 and 1919,
the reactions to the Communal Award in 1932, and the drafting of the Indian Constitu-
tion. In this article, I show the importance of the sequence of these events in shaping the
design and perceptions of today’s quota system. The British colonial rulers were actively
involved in the process, but the implementation of reservations after independence has
been more than merely a colonial legacy: At each point in history, the actors involved in
the decision-making process were different, the incentive structures for the actors
changed, and the power of the British slowly dwindled. Yet, the choices of the past
shaped the agendas at every stage. In the following discussion, I focus on four critical
junctures in the negotiation process that shaped the reservation system in use in India
today:
• Morley-Minto reforms: Political quotas for Muslims were enacted by the
Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. The motivation was to strengthen British inter-
ests in India.
• Ambedkar and the depressed classes: In the Council of India Act of 1919, the
SCs (depressed classes) were recognized as a separate community and were
guaranteed political representation. This was within a framework of limited fran-
chise and group-wise representation, a system that was continued in order to
keep earlier promises to the Muslim community to retain their loyalty.
• The Poona Pact: The Poona Pact of 1932 formalized an agreement between the
Indian National Congress and the representatives of the SCs, whereby SCs were
granted reserved seats as long as they gave up the demand for separate elector-
ates. At this time the language of justifying quotas shifted from focusing on guar-
anteeing representation for a specific community to being about “uplifting” a
poor segment of society.
• Drafting the Constitution: The violence at the time of partition turned the
Constituent Assembly against political safeguards for Muslims and other reli-
gious minorities. Reservations for SC were retained and no longer treated as a
communal demand, but as a way of helping a deprived group.
THE HISTORY OF RESERVATIONS IN INDIA
The idea of guaranteed representation for various communities in India goes back to
the days of the British Raj. During the nineteenth century, concerns were raised about
7Interview in Lucknow, November 21, 2010.
8Interview in Shimla, October 10, 2010.
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upper castes being over-represented in the civil service; in the princely state of Mysore,
reservations for backward classes were initiated as early as 1874 in the civil services (Bayly
1990, 195). At that time, whether or not to reserve political positions was not a relevant
issue, since there was virtually no representation of Indians in the political institutions of
the country.
The inclusion of Indians in political institutions was slow and gradual. In 1853, four
Indians were for the first time included as nonofficial members of the Governor-
General’s Council, in order to strengthen British control over India by contributing
their “local knowledge” (Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 37). The first Indian war of in-
dependence (often referred to as the Great Rebellion or the Indian Mutiny) in 1857 led
to several changes to British rule in India. After the Crown officially took control in 1858,
efforts were made to include Indians in the political establishment, in order to “provide
safety valves for the expression of public opinion which had been so badly misjudged
before the rebellion” (Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 2). As one of the British
members of the Viceregal Council, Sir Henry Bartle, wrote in a memorandum in
1860: “The addition of the native element has, I think, become necessary owing to our
diminished opportunities of learning through indirect channels what the natives think
of our measures, and how the native community will be affected by them” (quoted in
Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 38). This initial representation of Indians was also
ensured by the Indian Council Acts of 1861 and 1892, but the number of representatives
was small; moreover, they were appointed, not elected.
It was with the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 that Indians were, for the first time,
elected to various legislative councils in India, albeit with a restricted franchise. With this
inclusion of a representative element in the political system came discussions on who was
to represent whom.
Morley-Minto Reforms 1909: Quotas Enter the Stage
At the turn of the twentieth century, Indian nationalists, mainly represented by the
Indian National Congress (Congress), were advocating for more political influence. After
Lord Minto arrived as Viceroy in 1905, he started corresponding with the Liberal Secre-
tary of State, Lord Morley, about the possibility of enacting reforms to increase the rep-
resentation of Indians in the political system (Minto 1934). The discussion concerned
increasing the number of nonofficial Indian members in various legislative councils,
and including Indian representatives in the Council of the Secretary of State in
London and in the Viceroy’s Council in India. That same year, Minto appointed a com-
mittee to consider increasing local representation in the Indian legislative councils
(Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 47).
This was a time when religious minorities, mainly the Muslims, were anxious to
ensure political safeguards because they were “apprehensive of cultural homogenization”
(Mahajan 1998, 120). According to Galanter (1984, 25), British rule made Muslims feel
that they were falling behind Hindus, as it “shattered the earlier patterns of dominance
and accommodation, permitting, if not fostering, open rivalry” between the two groups.
The Muslim League was formed as a political alternative to the Congress in 1906. In
October 1906, while the Morley-Minto reform documents were being drafted, a delega-
tion of Muslims visited the Viceroy in Shimla to demand political safeguards. In an
address read by Sir Aga Khan III, they argued that Muslims would remain a minority
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in a plurality voting system, and that Muslims must be ensured communal representation.
Minto responded: “[T]he Mohammedan community may rest assured that their political
rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded by any administrative re-
organization with which I am concerned” (quoted in Minto 1934, 47).
Minto kept his promise. In the Indian Council Act of 1909 (the Morley-Minto
reforms) several communities, including Muslims, landholders, and various commercial
interests, were ensured the right to elect representatives from their own communities to
the Legislative Councils in British India (Ilbert 1910, 432–35).
The decision to grant political safeguards to Muslims was grounded in a belief in
group-based representation in India, as Minto explained in a letter to Morley: “The
only representation for which India is at presently fitted is a representation of Commu-
nities” (quoted in Minto 1934, 102). Minto expressed the same opinion in his opening
address to the new Legislative Council after the implementation of the reforms in
January 1910:
We have distinctly maintained that Representative Government, in its Western
sense, is totally inapplicable to the Indian Empire and would be uncongenial to
the traditions of Eastern populations; that Indian conditions do not admit of
popular representation. . . . But we have been deeply impressed by the changing
political conditions alluded to in my note, and we have endeavored to meet them
by broadening the representation authorized by the Council Act of 1893, by ex-
panding its rules of procedure and facilitating opportunities for debate, by invit-
ing the leaders of Indian public opinion to become fellow-workers, with us in the
British administration, and by securing the representation of those important in-
terests and communities which go to form the real strength of India, whilst at the
same time recognizing the claims of educational advance. (quoted in Minto
1934, 372)
From the personal correspondence between Morley and Minto, there can be little
doubt that in granting separate electorates to Muslims and other communities, these pol-
iticians were primarily concerned with securing British interests in India. In a letter dated
May 28, 1906, Minto wrote to Morley: “I have been thinking a good deal lately of a pos-
sible counterpoise to Congress aims. I think we may find a solution in the Council of
Princes. . .” (quoted in Minto 1934, 29). On November 23 the same year, Morley
wrote to Minto: “I incline to think that the admission of a Native, whether to your
Council or to mine, or to both, would be the cheapest concession we could make”
(quoted in Minto 1934, 101).
Thus, it was a need for local information, a pressure to make concessions to a growing
local elite, and a lack of belief in popular representation, that led to the introduction of
group representatives in political institutions in India. Representation was granted to in-
fluential communities—with no intention of moving the system in the direction of a
Western-style parliamentary democracy. The importance of this historical juncture was
made clear by Gandhi when he met Lady Minto in London many years later: “‘Do you
remember my name?’ I [Lady Minto] asked. ‘Remember your name!’ exclaimed Mr.
Gandhi. ‘The Minto-Morley Reforms have been our undoing. Had it not been for the
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Separate Electorates then established, we should have settled our differences by now’”
(quoted in Minto 1934, 21).
Dr. Ambedkar and the Depressed Classes
Ten years after the Morley-Minto reforms, other British administrators regretted the
choice that had been made in granting separate electorates to Muslims. Concerning the
reforms, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918, 49) stated: “It is probable that the far-
reaching consequences of this decision [to grant separate electorates] and the difficulties
which it would create at a later stage were not fully foreseen.” The authors rejected com-
munal electorates in principle:
A minority which is given special representation owing to its weak and backward
state, is positively encouraged to settle down into a feeling of satisfied security; it
is under no inducement to educate and qualify itself to make good the ground it
has lost compared with the stronger majority. On the other hand, the latter will
be tempted to feel that they have done all they need do for their weaker fellow
countrymen and that they are free to use their power for their own purposes.
The give-and-take which is the essence of political life is lacking. There is no in-
ducement to the one side to forbear, or to the other to exert itself. The commu-
nal system stereotypes existing relations. (Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 149)
Despite speaking against communal electorates, the authors of the report recom-
mended that the policy be continued, arguing that it was politically unfeasible to
revoke a right that had already been granted:
The Muhammadans regard these as settled facts, and any attempt to go back on
them will rouse a storm of bitter protest and put a severe strain on the loyalty of a
community which has behaved with conspicuous loyalty during a period of very
great difficulty. . . . How can we say to them that we regard the decision of 1909
as mistaken, that its retention is incompatible with progress towards responsible
government, that its reversal will eventually be to their benefit; and that for
these reasons we have decided to go back on it? (Montagu and Chelmsford
1918, 149)
Although its authors were against the continuation of the system of group-based rep-
resentation in principle, the report actually ended up recommending political safeguards
to several groups:
We have been pressed to extend the concession to Other communities. Some
have based their claim on their backward, others on their advanced, condition.
. . . Now our decision to maintain separate electorates for Muhammadans makes
it difficult for us to resist these other claims. . . . Any general extension of the
communal system, however, would only encourage still further demands, and
would in our deliberate opinion be fatal to that development of representation
upon the national basis on which alone a system of responsible government can
possibly be rooted. (Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 150)
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The SCs, or the “depressed classes” as they were commonly called at the time, had
not been considered for political safeguards in the discussions leading up to the Morley-
Minto reforms, since they were not an organized or influential community. But soon
thereafter Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar emerged as an important spokesperson for
the depressed classes.9 He was first asked to mobilize these classes on behalf of Congress
in 1917, but soon broke away from the Congress line and demanded separate represen-
tatives for the depressed classes.
In January 1919, Ambedkar made a representation to the Southborough Franchise
Committee, demanding political representation for the depressed classes. This was a
committee appointed on the basis of the recommendations of the Montagu-Chelmsford
report, broadly mandated to examine issues related to representation and elections.10 Ac-
cording to Jaffrelot (2005, 53), Ambedkar was consulted not because he belonged to any
organization or political party, but because he was the only person from the depressed
classes in the Bombay Presidency who held a graduate degree. In his representation,
Ambedkar argued that while minorities such as Muslims and Christians were “like-
minded” (homogeneous), Hindus were clearly divided into the “touchables” and the “un-
touchables.” Untouchables, he argued, had been treated like slaves for so long that they
knew nothing else, and “as can be easily seen they can be represented by the untouch-
ables alone. They are distinctively their own interests and none else can truly voice
them” (Ambedkar 1919, point 22). He also argued that the untouchables would never
be elected to hold offices since they were in the minority and were seen as inferior:
“[T]erritorial constituencies fail to create popular Government because they fail to
secure personal representation to members of minor groups” (Ambedkar 1919, point 10).
From his speech, it is clear that Ambedkar envisioned that representatives from the
SC community would voice the concerns of the SC community, which he considered dis-
tinct from the interests of other Hindus. Interestingly, however, rather than spelling out
how representation might translate into socioeconomic benefits for the community, he
emphasized that group-based representation would reduce social bias by bringing togeth-
er caste groups in the legislative assemblies that usually did not interact: “So long as each
caste or a group remains isolated its attitude remains fossilized. But the moment the
several castes and groups begin to have contact and co-operation with one another the
resocialization of the fossilized attitude is bound to be the result” (Ambedkar 1919,
point 40).
Ambedkar succeeded in convincing the Franchise Committee that the SC commu-
nity needed their own representatives. On the basis of the recommendations in the com-
mittee’s report, the Government of India Act of 1919 continued the separate electorates
9Dr. Ambedkar grew up in Maharashtra. After completing his schooling in India, he received schol-
arships to study in the United States and England, where he took a law degree and a PhD in po-
litical science. His first systematic critique of the caste system was in a paper presented at an
anthropology seminar as a graduate student at Columbia University in May 1916 (Ambedkar
1916). From then on, he remained a public spokesperson for the rights of the untouchable
community.
10The committee considered various types of electoral systems (constituency size, and voting
methods) and recommended “the most simple method of election”: plurality voting in single-
member districts. The reason given was that electors were “inexperienced in the exercise of the
vote” (Government of India 1928a, 8).
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for religious groups and also established a system of nomination of a few representatives
from the depressed classes. The depressed classes were thereby recognized as a separate
community, alongside religious communities, landholders, and other interest groups.
It is important to note that at this time, the Indian nationalists did not limit them-
selves to discussing quotas as the only form of political safeguard for minority groups.
In 1916, Congress and the Muslim League came together and agreed on a scheme of
proposals for a constitutional framework for India. This “Lucknow Pact” stated that all
“important minorities” should have reserved seats. It was also proposed that the
members of a community represented in the Imperial and Provincial Councils should
have the power to veto bills or resolutions contrary to their interests (Montagu and
Chelmsford 1918, 105). However, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report rejected the idea
of a veto for minorities as “unworkable,” and argued that general protection of religious
interests was ensured by the clause that stated that the Governor-General must approve
all laws affecting communities (Montagu and Chelmsford 1918, 105–6). Thus, the idea of
veto powers was taken off the agenda by the British rulers, and group-based representa-
tion remained the main type of political safeguard discussed for minority groups.
In 1927, the Simon Commission was appointed by the British government to make
recommendations for further reforms. The Simon Report recommended continuing the
policy of guaranteeing political representation for religious minorities and the depressed
classes, although such group-based representation was described as an “undoubted obsta-
cle in the way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship” (Brock and Simon 1930,
96). Since all the members of the Simon Commission were British, it was boycotted by
Congress—although not by the various minority organizations in the country—and the
Indian parties were consequently requested to formulate their own proposals for the
drafting of the new Constitution. In response to this request, the All Parties Conference
met in Delhi in January 1928. At the third meeting of the Conference, a smaller commit-
tee was appointed—headed by Motilal Nehru—with the mandate to make recommenda-
tions for a constitutional framework. The authors of the Nehru Report (Government of
India 1928b, 36–38) were opposed to quotas of any form. They proposed various other
ways of safeguarding the interests of minorities, such as guaranteeing language rights and
introducing a proportional representation (PR) system of voting: “We feel strongly at-
tracted to this method [a PR electoral system] and are of the opinion that it offers the
only rational and just way of meeting the fears and claims of various communities.
There is a place in it for every minority and an automatic adjustment takes place of
rival interests. We have no doubt that proportional representation will in the future be
the solution of our problems.”
The organizations of the depressed classes had not been consulted by the committee,
and Ambedkar rejected the proposals in the report, insisting that the depressed classes
needed either reserved seats or separate electorates in order to ensure their political
presence (Jaffrelot 2005, 56). The ideas in the report also met strong opposition from
the British, who thought a PR system would be too complicated for the Indian voter.11
11During the Constituent Assembly debates, the idea of using a PR system of voting was suggested
by several members as a plausible alternative to reservations, but was rejected on the grounds that it
was too complicated for the uneducated population and too difficult to implement in a country the
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In this way, the choice of selecting communal representatives made in the beginning
of the twentieth century was brought into the first drafts of the Indian Constitution,
because of feelings of obligation to uphold old promises, and fears of rebellion. With
the continuation of group representation, the depressed classes were recognized as a sep-
arate community that needed separate political representation.
The Poona Pact
When the report presented by the Simon Commission was rejected by all major
players in India, the British Government called a roundtable conference in London to
negotiate political solutions. Three such conferences were convened in London to nego-
tiate the future of India.
The first roundtable conference was held from November 1930 to January 1931.
Congress refused to participate, since many of its leaders had been jailed because of
involvement in the ongoing Civil Disobedience Movement. Ambedkar and Bahadur
R. Srinivasan were present as representatives of the depressed classes. During the
conference, they submitted a memorandum to the Minorities Committee, in which
they stated the terms under which the depressed classes would consent to placing them-
selves under majority rule in a self-governed India. While the depressed classes had not
been a strong political force in India until then, it is likely that their case was strengthened
by the fact that Congress was not present at the conference. In addition to equal rights
and a seat in the cabinet, Ambedkar demanded “adequate representation” for the de-
pressed classes in the legislatures of India. More specifically, he wanted adult suffrage
and separate electorates for the depressed classes for the first ten years after indepen-
dence, and thereafter reserved seats with joint electorates (Ambedkar and Srinivasan
1982, condition no. 4).
At the second roundtable conference, held September 1931 to December 1931,
Gandhi was present as the sole representative of Congress. Promoting a united India,
he was strongly opposed to separate electorates for any group, but “he grudgingly con-
ceded them to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and Anglo-Indians” (Galanter 1984, 31).
Gandhi made it clear, however, that he was not prepared to give political recognition
to any other community, and threatened to fast unto death if the depressed classes
were given separate electorates.12 As an alternative, Gandhi presented to the Minorities
Committee a memorandum with a proposal for a Communal Settlement (Sheth and
Mahajan 1999, 114). It called for the constitutional protection of culture and language,
as well as free religious practice for all minorities. It proposed adult franchise and joint
electorates, but with constituencies that would enable all communities to secure a pro-
portionate share of legislative seats. Hindus and Muslims were also to be guaranteed re-
served seats where they were less than 25 percent of the population.13
size of India. See, e.g., the discussion following Mr. Lari’s proposal of PR on Wednesday, May 25,
1949 (CAD 1999, vol. 8).
12See Jaffrelot (2005) for an excellent discussion of why Gandhi chose this drastic step.
13A similar provision was made for Hindus in Sind, Muslims in Assam, and Sikhs in Punjab and the
North West Frontier Province (Chanchreek, Prasad, and Kumar 1991, 176).
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Ambedkar was also present at the second roundtable conference, where he again de-
manded quotas for the depressed classes in the legislatures, the executive, and the public
services, and that there should be “certain limitations” in order to “prevent the majorities
from abusing their legislative power in such a manner as to enact laws which would create
discrimination between one citizen and another” (quoted in Chanchreek, Prasad, and
Kumar 1991, 95). He focused on a package of safeguards, rather than only reservations
as such, because he recognized that with a small number of reserved seats, “there is
always the danger of the interests of the depressed classes being neglected altogether”
(quoted in Chanchreek, Prasad, and Kumar 1991, 98). British Prime Minister Ramsay
MacDonald responded to the demands of the roundtable conferences by presenting
the Communal Award of 1932, in which he granted the depressed classes separate elec-
torates in seventy-eight areas where they were concentrated, as well as the right to vote in
the remaining unreserved areas (Government of India 1932). He also conceded to many
of the demands from other minorities, such as granting Muslims in Punjab and Bengal
separate electorates and more seats than other communities in the provincial assemblies
(Jalal 1994, 12–13).
Following the announcement of the Communal Award, Gandhi, who was
imprisoned in Yerwada jail in Pune at the time, went on a hunger strike against the sep-
arate electorates for the depressed classes. The British refused to change the Award
without the consent of Ambedkar. In order to resolve the situation, meetings were
called between Ambedkar and Congress leaders, and Ambedkar was subjected to
heavy pressure to drop the provision for separate electorates. On September 24, 1932,
the Poona Pact was signed. Ambedkar had abandoned the demand for the seventy-
eight separate electorates in the Award, in return for 151 reserved seats in provincial
assemblies, to be elected with joint electorates. The Poona Pact (1932) also provided
for 18 percent of the seats in the central legislature to be reserved for the depressed
classes.
Many considered the Poona Pact a victory for Ambedkar, since he gained a signifi-
cant increase in the number of reserved seats for his community. Ambedkar himself
saw it as a failure, because the representatives of the depressed classes would no
longer be elected by, and answerable to, an electorate of untouchables. He argued
that the result is that a politician elected from reserved constituencies “instead of
being a champion of the minority is really a slave of the majority” (quoted in Samujh
2005, 59).
In his Mr. Gandhi and the Emancipation of the Untouchables, Ambedkar (1943,
24–25) went even further, arguing that Congress’s intention with insisting on joint elec-
torates was to control the politicians elected from reserved seats:
[S]eparate electorate does not permit the Hindus to capture the seats reserved
for the Untouchables. On the other hand the joint electorate does. . . . [If] there
is a joint electorate in these constituencies the representative of the Untouch-
ables would be only a nominal representative and not a real representative,
for no Untouchable who did not agree to be a nominee of the Hindus and a
tool in their hands could be elected in a joint electorate in which the Untouch-
able voter was out numbered in ratio of 1 to 24 or in some cases 1 to 49.
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India’s reservation system can in some sense be seen as the direct product of the
compromise between Gandhi and Ambedkar in the Poona Pact. Yet, as I indicated in pre-
vious sections, the role of the British negotiating partners should not be underrated. At
the time of the Poona Pact, the negotiation was about having no reservations versus re-
served seats with separate electorates for the depressed classes, and the compromise
became reserved seats with joint electorates. But these negotiations were a response
to the Communal Award handed down by the British. As was clear in the All Parties Con-
ference in 1916, in the Nehru Report of 1928, and in the representations made by
Gandhi and Ambedkar in London, Indian nationalists had been open to other forms of
political safeguards for minorities and under-represented groups. It was the British
choice of institutionalizing communal representation, while rejecting other types of safe-
guards as too complicated, that limited the debate to this single type of safeguard.
This round of negotiations also resulted in a disjuncture between the arguments
about safeguards and the policies chosen: Gandhi fought for an ideal of unity, where
the untouchables were to be uplifted by being integrated into the Hindu fold, whereas
Ambedkar argued that the depressed classes would be able to break the shackles of
the caste system only if they could elect their own representatives. During the intense
discussions in this round of negotiations and the attempts to justify the benefits of the
different policies, the debate therefore shifted focus—from being about political repre-
sentation for a group with a separate identity to being about how to best uplift a deprived
segment of Hindu society.
Through the Poona Pact and the promise of reserved seats, the SC identity was in-
stitutionalized, preventing the unity that Gandhi was fighting for. At the same time, by
getting joint electorates, SCs were unable to elect their own leaders, which Ambedkar
had fought for. Ambedkar was deeply disappointed with this settlement, convinced
that the joint electorates would make SC politicians mere tools in the hands of the
upper castes and would therefore not lead to the betterment of the SC community at
large. Neither Ambedkar nor Gandhi was happy with this compromise—and the
options they were negotiating over were the ones that had been handed down to them
from the colonial rulers.
Once agreement had been reached, the effect was powerful: both the British and the
members of the Indian Constituent Assembly felt obliged to follow up by reserving seats
with joint electorates for the depressed classes.
Drafting the Constitution
The Government of India Act of 1935 was the last pre-independence constitution of
India. In 1946, a Constituent Assembly was elected to draft the Indian Constitution, with
Ambedkar as the chair of the Drafting Committee. The Sub-committee on Minorities,
established by the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly on Fundamental
Rights and Minorities (Advisory Committee) was tasked with making recommendations
about representational guarantees for minorities (Sheth and Mahajan 1999, 116).
Ambedkar fought for separate electorates once again, and when that proved futile, he
tried to get provisions for having a minimum of 35 percent SCs in reserved constituen-
cies, so that at least a large portion of the electorate should be SC. Both the Advisory
Committee and the Constituent Assembly consisted of a majority of Congress supporters,
and almost half of the members of the Assembly were Brahmins (Austin 1999, Appendix
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III). It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Ambedkar’s demands were rejected. In the
end, the Advisory Committee recommended reserved seats for SCs and religious minor-
ities—but rejected demands for separate electorates, primaries, a minimum percentage
of the minority group in the constituencies that were chosen to be reserved, reservations
in cabinets, requirements for a minimum percentage of the votes from the minority com-
munity, and giving different weights to voters from different communities.
The report of the Advisory Committee was presented to the Constituent Assembly
on August 27, 1947, by the chairman of the committee, Sardar Vallabhbhai J. Patel. In an
impassioned speech, he argued that communal representation was a “poison which has
entered into the body politic of our country” (CAD 1999, vol. 5, August 27, 1947,
225), and explained that the Advisory Committee had supported reserved seats in joint
electorates for SCs and religious minorities as a compromise solution to make these
groups feel comfortable with the new electoral system. The committee report itself
stated that the existence of separate electorates has “sharpened communal differences
to a dangerous extent and has proved one of the main stumbling blocks to the develop-
ment of a healthy national life” (reprinted as an appendix in CAD 1999, vol. 5, 243).
The Assembly debate that followed was both about whether to have reserved seats at
all, and about whether there should be separate or joint electorates. Many representatives
were strongly opposed to any form of group-based representation. Although he had just
brought to the floor a report recommending reserved seats for SCs, Sardar Patel soon
thereafter delivered a fiery speech against the same reservation system:
I do not understand how Mr. Khandekar [an SC representative who had just
spoken] is a Scheduled Caste man. If he and I were to go outside India,
nobody will find out whether he is a Scheduled Caste man or I am a Scheduled
Caste man. There is no Scheduled Caste between us. So those representatives of
the Scheduled Caste must know that the Scheduled Caste has to be effaced al-
together from our society, and if it is to be effaced, those who have ceased to be
untouchables and sit amongst us have to forget that they are untouchables or
else if they carry this inferiority complex, they will not be able to serve their com-
munity. They will only be able to serve their community by feeling now that they
are with us. (CAD 1999, vol. 5, August 28, 1947, 272)
In defense of having reserved seats, the Christian representative Jerome D’Souza re-
minded the Constituent Assembly that “for years together the Congress party has been
associated with the demand that there shall be joint electorates with reservation. At this
stage to give up reservation as some of my friends wish to do would be in contradiction to
the promises held out” (CAD 1999, vol. 5, August 27, 1947, 231). In this way, discussions
of the previous decades were used to legitimize reserved seats. Similarly, an SC represen-
tative fromMadras, Muniswami Pillai, invoked the memory of the Poona Pact in a speech
supporting the introduction of reserved seats with joint electorates:
It was that Poona Pact to which you yourself have been a signatory along with me
and Dr. Ambedkar, that produced a great awakening in this country. Then, Sir,
one question was in the mind of everybody, whether the Poona Pact will show
signs of a change of heart by caste Hindus in this country. Today I may assure
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you, Sir, that that change has come, though not full 100 per cent, at least more
than 50 per cent. I may give you instances here. The very inclusion of
Dr. Ambedkar in the present Dominion Cabinet is a change of heart of the
Caste Hindus that the Harijans [SCs] are not any more to be neglected.
(CAD 1999, vol. 5, August 27, 1947, 202)
Some of the representatives in the Assembly also wanted more than what had been
recommended in the report. The SC representative S. Nagappa raised several issues that
the Advisory Committee had already discussed and rejected. He first demanded reserva-
tions in the cabinets: “I want my due share; though I am innocent, ignorant, dumb, yet I
want you to recognize my claim” (CAD 1999, vol. 5, August 27, 1947, 207). He then
moved an amendment whereby candidates would have to poll at least 35 percent of
the votes of the SC community in order to win elections in reserved constituencies.14
His argument here reflected Ambedkar’s argument about the need for SC politicians
to be answerable to an SC electorate:
[T]oday if we are elected to reserved seats, when there is agrarian trouble, when
the Harijans and the agriculturists are at loggerheads and when we go and
appeal to these people these Harijans they say “Get out man, you are the hench-
men and show-boys of the caste Hindus. You have sold our community and you
have come here on their behalf in order to cut our throats. We don’t accept you
as our representative.” Sir, in order to avoid that, what I suggested is that a
certain percentage of the Harijans must elect the candidate so that he may be
able to tell them that he has the backing of some Harijans and he will have
the prestige and voice as their representative. (CAD 1999, vol. 5, August 28,
1947, 259)
Interestingly, Nagappa argued that being a member of the SC community is not
enough to be perceived as a legitimate representative of SCs. Representatives also
need to be elected by SCs and be answerable to the SC community. However, his
demands found little support in the Assembly. On August 28, 1947, the report of the Ad-
visory Committee was adopted with only minor changes (Sheth and Mahajan 1999,
117).15
Later, however, after the horrors of the partition between India and Pakistan had
sunk in, attitudes among the members of the Constituent Assembly towards concessions
to minorities changed. In May 1949, the Advisory Committee passed a resolution to
abolish reservations for religious minorities, while retaining them for another ten years
14Nagappa moved this amendment mainly as a matter of principle, and withdrew it before it was
voted upon. One of the Muslim representatives, K. T. M. Ahmed Ibrahim Sahib Bahadur,
moved a similar amendment for a minimum of 30 percent support from the community. This
amendment was rejected by the Assembly.
15At that time, Christians and Muslims were also granted reserved seats proportional to their share
of the population, and Anglo-Indians were to be nominated by the Governor-General of the state.
Parsis renounced the right to any form of representational safeguard.
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for SCs. In a letter of May 11, 1949, to the president of the Constituent Assembly, Sardar
Patel explained the motivation for their change in opinion:
Some members of the committee felt that, conditions having vastly changed
since the Advisory Committee made their recommendations in 1947, it was
no longer appropriate in the context of free India and of present conditions
that there should be reservation of seats for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs or any
other religious minority. Although the abolition of separate electorates had
removed much of the poison from the body politic, the reservation of seats
for religious communities, it was felt, still led to a certain degree of separatism
and was to that extent contrary to the conception of a secular democratic state.
(printed as an appendix in CAD 1999, vol. 8, 311)
When the Constituent Assembly discussed the resolution, it was clear that the
Muslim representatives were divided in their opinions about reserved seats, while
most others supported the removal of reservations for religious minorities. The
Muslim representative Begam Aizaz Rasul was one of the strongest supporters of remov-
ing reservations. She stated that “reservation is a self-destructive weapon which separates
the minorities from the majority for all time” (CAD 1999, vol. 8, May 25, 1949, 300). Sim-
ilarly, in an impassioned speech against reservations, the Muslim representative Tajamul
Husein proclaimed that “the term ‘minority’ is a British creation. The British created mi-
norities. The British have gone and minorities have gone with them” (CAD 1999, vol. 8,
May 26, 1949, 333). Yet another representative argued that this was a measure the British
had implemented to “play their own game,” and that now that the British were gone there
should be no reason to have political safeguards for anyone (CAD 1999, vol. 8, May 26,
1949, 317). Where did this shift in opinion come from? According to one representative,
the decision to keep reservations in 1947 was based solely on the fact that groups were
accustomed to separate electorates, and that the leap to no group-based representation
whatsoever seemed too drastic. After a few years of getting used to not having separate
electorates, however, it was now time to “proceed towards a compact nation” (CAD 1999,
vol. 8, May 26, 1949, 321). According to another representative, in 1947 the Assembly
had been afraid of seeming too harsh on minorities. He argued that the change in senti-
ment stemmed from the fact that “[c]ommunal incidents have played havoc in this
country” (CAD 1999, vol. 8, May 26, 1949, 317).
And so, reserved seats for religious minorities were removed. One representative
suggested reopening the discussion about the electoral system—probably hoping for a
proportional form of electoral system that would be more conducive to electing minority
representatives—but that was again shot down with the argument that a PR system would
be too complicated for India. The debate was put to an end by Sardar Patel, who thun-
dered that this was an attempt at sneaking reservations in through “the back door” (CAD
1999, vol. 8, May 26, 1949, 353).
While the quotas for religious groups were removed, it was decided to retain the pro-
visions for SCs. This decision as not uncontested. Mahavir Tyagi argued that the category
itself was a British artifact, and proposed class-based rather than caste-based representa-
tional guarantees:
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I want to emphasise . . . [that] originally when the Scheduled Castes were given
separate representation, Mahatma Gandhi had started his fast in protest. Now
we have, it seems, accepted the idea; but when it was first introduced, everybody
was shocked. . . . The term “Scheduled Castes” is a fiction. Factually there is no
such thing as “Scheduled Castes.” There are some castes who are depressed,
some castes who are poor, some who are untouchables, some who are down-
trodden. All their names were collected from the various provinces and put
into one category “Scheduled Castes.” In spite of the category being a fiction
it has been there for so many years. . . . Sir. How is Dr. Ambedkar a member
of the Scheduled Castes? Is he illiterate? Is he ill-educated? Is he an untouch-
able? Is he lacking in anything? He is the finest of the fine intellectuals in India
and still he is in the list of Scheduled Castes. . . . By allowing caste representa-
tions, let us not re-inject the poisonous virus which the Britisher has introduced
into our body politic. I would suggest Sir, that instead of the so called Scheduled
Caste, minorities be protected, if you like, on class basis. (CAD 1999, vol. 3, May
26, 1949, 344)
Many other members of the Constituent Assembly were also opposed to granting
quotas to SCs, but the majority grudgingly supported it. One member of the Assembly
argued: “I have no hesitation in saying that if we had removed even this provision
[reservations for SCs] from the Constitution, it would have been for the better.
But because the Scheduled Castes are poor, uneducated and suffer because of their
status in society and because of the prevailing social customs, it would have been
unjust not to provide for them some special facility in the Constitution” (CAD 1999,
vol. 3, May 26, 1949, 339). Similarly, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,
stated: “Frankly I would like this proposal to go further and put an end to such re-
servations as there still remain. But again, speaking frankly, I realise that in the
present state of affairs in India that would not be a desirable thing to do . . . in regard
to the Scheduled Castes. I try to look upon the problem not in the sense of religious
minority, but rather in the sense of helping backward groups in the country” (CAD
1999, vol. 8, May 26, 1949, 331).
Thus, while the introduction of reservations for SCs had initially been justified
by them having “distinctively their own interests” that others would not be able to
represent (Ambedkar 1919, point 22), it was now stated that SCs were given reservations
not on grounds of their group identity, but “apparently and clearly on grounds of
their economic, social and educational backwardness” (CAD 1999, vol. 3, May 25,
1949, 308).
On May 26, 1949, the Constituent Assembly voted in favor of the recommendations
of the Advisory Committee, granting SCs reserved seats with joint electorates. As the
debates clearly show, many were opposed to this measure, but saw it as a way of
helping members of the SC community become electorally competitive, as well as uplift-
ing the community in general.
The reservation system was originally set to last for only ten years, in order for SC
candidates to become sufficiently integrated into the political system to be able to
contest elections on an equal footing with other candidates. But every ten years since
then, as the rules were about to expire, they have been extended.
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In 1959, the Minister of Home Affairs, G. B. Pant, moved to extend the reservations
for the first time: “The reasons which weighted with, and influenced, the Constituent As-
sembly in making provisions for these reservations have not ceased to exist” (Lok Sabha
Debates, November 30, 1959, 2443). The minister assumed that political reservations
would lead to socioeconomic development for SCs: “I know that if they [reservations]
go on working, they [SCs] will perhaps attain further progress in educational, administra-
tive and other fields. . . . [W]e have to remember that if they [SCs] had made progress in
those directions, that progress too is, to a large extent, due to their representation in the
legislatures” (Lok Sabha Debates, November 30, 1959, 2443). The “helping backward
groups” was now interpreted as creating development for the SC community at large,
not making SC candidates competitive in elections.
Similarly, in 1969, the Minister of Law and Social Welfare, Mr. Govinda Menon,
moved for yet another extension of the quota system:
Our attempts to ameliorate the condition of the Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes, our attempts to bring them up to a level which is equal to the
rest of the population of the country have not fully succeeded. So far as I am
concerned, I do not believe that the depression which was effected by the
Hindu society on the Scheduled Castes could be rectified in two or three
decades. (Lok Sabha Debates, December 8, 1969, 282)
In 1980, 1989, 1999, and 2009, the same types of arguments were repeated, and the
policy was extended. The wording was similar every time. In 2009, the Minister of Law
and Justice, Mr. M. Veerappa Moily, introduced the bill to amend the Constitution in the
following way: “the reasons which weighed the Constituent Assembly in making the pro-
visions with regard to the aforesaid reservation of seats . . . have not ceased to exist” (Lok
Sabha Debates, August 4, 2009, 299–300).
In every debate there were a few voices who spoke against extension. During the
debate in 1959, the independent Member of Parliament (MP) B. C. Kamble raised
the point that it is absurd to grant quotas on the basis of “untouchability” when untouch-
ability has been abolished by the Indian Constitution (Lok Sabha Debates, November 30,
1959, 2450).
In 1969, MP M. R. Masani of the Swatantra Party summarized many of the argu-
ments against reservations in one speech:
It seems to me that one of the bad things that this reservation has done is to put
the conscience of the upper class and the upper castes to sleep. Having given a
few seats to the Harijans and the Adivasis [STs], those who are better-placed
think they have done their duty by them and now they can fend for themselves.
. . . [The result is the] coming into existence by reservations of an upper crust of
Harijans and others who have become a vested interest in our political life and
who, though they are done very well for themselves, are not the best champions
for fighting the cause of the Harijans and backwards classes. . . . No proof has
been given by the Hon. Minister or anybody else to show that this reservation
has in practice led to concrete advance and benefits for this class. (Lok Sabha
Debates, December 8, 1969, 299–300)
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These arguments were not followed up by the other MPs. Every time the issue was
discussed, the ministers and MPs reiterated the history of the Poona Pact, Ambedkar’s
hard work, and Gandhi’s involvement in trying to uplift deprived groups such as the
SCs. In this way, the arguments of the past—no longer about political representation,
but about development for SCs—were handed down from one Parliament to the next.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has traced the history of how electoral quotas in India took shape through
a negotiation process that lasted from about 1905 until the signing of the Indian Consti-
tution in 1950. It may seem paradoxical that the group-based political representation
that arose from the British attempt to strengthen their own control of India eventually
resulted in one of the world’s most extensive quota systems for minorities. This history
is therefore a clear example of how many policies come into existence as the result of
complicated path-dependent processes.
The institutional result of this historical process was a quota system that was a com-
promise between many different political goals, and that was not strongly supported by
anyone. The designers of the Indian Constitution were keenly aware of the incentives
created for representatives elected from reserved constituencies, and were deeply
opposed to a system that would encourage politicians to work only for their own
groups. For the majority of the political elite at the time, any kind of group-based repre-
sentation was unacceptable, because it was thought to reinforce and exacerbate existing
social cleavages. Thus we see a clear disjuncture between the rhetoric of socioeconomic
upliftment of post-Independence parliamentary debates and the initial intentions of the
reservation system.
The discussions about quotas in India illustrate the difficult trade-offs in how political
institutions such as quotas should be designed. It might seem attractive to create quotas
that incentivize minorities to work only for minority interests, but that might come at the
cost of social and political integration. In the Indian case, the drafters of the Constitution
were wary of strengthening communal sentiments and were therefore adamant about
having joint electorates in order to integrate SC politicians into mainstream politics.
Since then, India has become quite mired down in reservations: quotas in govern-
ment services and educational institutions have been expanded to include not only SCs
and STs, but also “Other Backward Classes” (OBCs), and the electoral quota system
has been expanded to local-level politics for SCs, STs, OBCs, and women. There is
also an ongoing discussion about establishing quotas for women and Muslims in state as-
semblies and in Parliament. This has led to complicated debates about how many posi-
tions can actually be reserved, and how to deal with sub-quotas within the reservations
system. Here it should be borne in mind that in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, many
Indian politicians preferred a more proportional form of electoral system to quotas. As
this article has shown, it was the agenda-setting powers of the colonial rulers that led
Indian politicians down a path of fighting for various types of quotas, instead of discussing
alternative forms of safeguards for minorities.
Mired in Reservations 103
Acknowledgments
I am very grateful for all the valuable comments on previous versions of this article.
Special thanks go to Paul Brass, Pradeep Chhibber, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, Paul Kenny,
Adnan Naseemullah, Pamela Price, Arild Engelsen Ruud, Vasundhara Sirnate, Pavithra
Suryanarayan, Ashutosh Varshney, Rahul Verma, Anne Waldrop, and Steven Wilkinson.
List of References
AMBEDKAR, BHIMRAO RAMJI. 1916. Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Devel-
opment. Jullundur, India: Bheem Patrika Publications.
——. 1919. “Evidence before the Southborough Committee on Franchise.” http://www.
ambedkar.org/ambcd/07.%20Evidence%20before%20the%20Southborough%20
Committee.htm (accessed October 2012).
——. 1943.Mr. Gandhi and the Emancipation of the Untouchables. Bombay: Thacker &
Co.
AMBEDKAR, BHIMRAO RAMJI, and RAO BAHADUR R. SRINIVASAN. 1982. “A Scheme of Polit-
ical Safeguards for the Protection of the Depressed Classes in the Future Constitu-
tion of Self-Governing India, Appendix I to the Report of Sub Committee No. Ill
(Minorities).” http://www.ambedkar.org/ambcd/15A.%20Dr.%20Ambedkar%20at%
20the%20Round%20Table%20Conferences.htm#api (accessed October 2012).
AUSTIN, GRANVILLE. 1999. Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
BAYLY, CHRISTOPHER ALAN. 1990. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BROCK, ROBERT, and WILLIAM JOHN ALLSEBROOK SIMON. 1930. The Simon Report on India.
London: J. M. Dent.
CAD (CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES: OFFICIAL REPORT). 1999. New Delhi: Lok Sabha
Secretariat.
CHANCHREEK, K. L., SAROJ PRASAD, and RAKESH KUMAR. 1991. Social Justice and Political
Safeguards for Depressed Classes. New Delhi: Shree Publishing House.
DELIMITATION COMMISSION OF INDIA. 2008.Changing Face of Electoral India: Delimitation
2008. New Delhi: Delimitation Commission of India.
GALANTER, MARC. 1984. Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. 1928a. Indian Constitutional Reforms: Reports of the Franchise
Committee and the Committee on Division of Functions. Calcutta: Government of
India Central Publication Branch.
——. 1928b. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference to Determine the
Principles of the Constitution for India: Together with a Summary of the Proceedings
of the Conference Held at Lucknow. Calcutta: Government of India Central Publi-
cation Branch.
——. 1932. Communal Award. Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication
Branch.
——. 1942. Government of India Act, 1935. London: H. M. Stationery Office.
ILBERT, COURTENAY PEREGRINE. 1910. The Government of India: Supplementary Chapter:
Indian Councils Act, 1909. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
104 Francesca R. Jensenius
JAFFRELOT, CHRISTOPHE. 2005. Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting
Caste. London: C. Hurst & Co.
JALAL, AYESHA. 1994. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand
for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
JENSENIUS, FRANCESCA REFSUM. 2013. “Was the Delimitation Commission Unfair to
Muslims?” Studies in Indian Politics 1(2):213–29.
LOK SABHA DEBATES. 1959–2009. New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat.
MAHAJAN, GURPREET. 1998. Identities and Rights: Aspects of Liberal Democracy in India.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
MINTO, MARY CAROLINE GREY ELLIOT-MURRAY-KYNYNMOUND. 1934. India, Minto and
Morley, 1905–1910: Compiled from the Correspondence between the Viceroy and
the Secretary of State. London: Macmillan.
MONTAGU, EDWIN SAMUEL, and LORD CHELMSFORD. 1918. Report on Indian Constitution-
al Reforms. Calcutta: Great Britain India Office, Superintendent Government
Printing.
POONA PACT. 1932. http://www.ambedkar.org/impdocs/poonapact.htm (accessed October
2012).
RAM, KANSHI. 1982. The Chamcha Age: An Era of the Stooges. New Delhi: Kanshi Ram.
SAMUJH, RAM. 2005. Reservation Policy: Its Relevance in Modern India. Mumbai:
Samrudh Bharat.
SHETH, D. L., and GURPREET MAHAJAN. 1999. Minority Identities and the Nation-State.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Mired in Reservations 105
